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Message from the Director:
Better Buying Power 3.0
The Homeland Defense and Security Information Analysis Center supports Better Buy-ing Power 3.0, a Department 
of Defense initiative to achieve domi-
nant capabilities through technical ex-
cellence and innovation. Incentivizing 
innovation in industry and government, 
one component of BBP 3.0, is focused 
on in this highlight. 
HDIAC’s various services, including the 
inquiry process, HDIAC Journal, web-
site and Core Analysis Task, increases 
the government’s return on and access 
to small business research and devel-
opment. By providing customers with 
high quality information and analysis 
in its inquiry responses, HDIAC is able 
to help the government leverage small 
businesses with creative and innova-
tive technologies to work with the DoD 
and have their technologies included in 
products the DoD acquires.
HDIAC recently received an inquiry 
from the United States Special Opera-
tions Command requesting information 
and analysis on medical mannequins 
with more realistic tissue structures 
to train special operations medics on 
combat wound treatment. The rigid 
plastic of traditional mannequins often 
makes it difficult to judge the appropri-
ate pressure needed for treatment in 
the field. 
HDIAC analyzed SOCOM’s unique 
technical requirements and options 
employed by the Department of De-
fense. Through research, HDIAC iden-
tified industry innovations that could 
provide enhanced medical manne-
quins to create realistic special opera-
tions medical trauma training.  HDIAC’s 
inquiry response made recommenda-
tions to SOCOM to improve training by 
employing medical mannequins with 
more accurate tissue, muscle and skin 
composition and biologically relevant 
materials.
Historically, soldiers and medics used 
human cadavers and animals for 
training. However, HDIAC’s research 
showed there are options better suit-
ed for current military needs. HDIAC 
identified numerous companies devel-
oping medical mannequins that could 
suit SOCOM’s needs. These compa-
nies are developing innovative prod-
ucts, including soft tissues, organs and 
skeletal systems, which SOCOM could 
utilize to better prepare medics for ad-
dressing combat injuries. 
HDIAC’s inquiry response provided an 
understanding of SOCOM’s medical 
training needs and an overall aware-
ness of easily modifiable options that 
meet those needs. Because of the in-
quiry response provided by HDIAC, 
SOCOM initiated relationships with in-
dustry partners. 
HDIAC’s analysis benefited SOCOM 
by providing alternative options to 
current trauma training and increased 
knowledge of currently available capa-
bilities and materials to create realistic 
tissues in training mannequins. 
By engaging HDIAC in these areas, 
SOCOM learned of emerging technol-
ogies and was able to engage indus-
try partners. Because HDIAC provided 
SOCOM an extensive understanding 
of industry capabilities, SOCOM was 
able to engage only those companies 
capable of meeting SOCOM’s require-
ments, which eliminates unproductive 
process and bureaucracy.  SOCOM’s 
relationships with these partners will 
save money and resources because 
the government will not have to flow 
through its own research and devel-
opment lifecycle to develop a usable 
product. 
Furthermore, SOCOM will be able to 
take advantage of HDIAC’s Core Anal-
ysis Task, a contract vehicle that in-
centivizes productivity and innovation 
in academia, government and industry 
and controls lifecycle costs. 
Better Buying Power
 Focus Areas
1. Achieve Affordable Programs
2. Control Costs Throughout the 
Product Lifecycle
3. Incentivize Productivity 
and Innovation in Industry 
and Government
4. Eliminate Unproductive Pro-
cesses and Bureaucracy
5. Promote Effective Competition
6. Improve Tradecraft in Acquisi-
tion of Services
7. Improve the Professionalism of 
the Total Acquisition Workforce
Stuart Stough
HDIAC Director
If a dirty bomb detonates or a nucle-ar power plant accident occurs, re-sponders must be equipped to han-dle the resulting potential wide-area 
radiological contamination. Minimizing 
radiological contamination, protecting 
people and the environment, and re-
storing services to critical infrastructure 
is vital. Depending on the scope of the 
incident, the response could be costly, 
lengthy and pose numerous challenges 
to the resilience of the affected commu-
nity. Having readily available mitigation 
and decontamination technology op-
tions will assist local, state and federal 
radiation responders to formulate a re-
silient response and recovery effort in 
the event of a radiological incident. 
By taking advantage of timely, cost-ef-
fective mitigation options, early re-
sponders will mitigate radiological 
contamination, thus reducing dose and 
allowing continuity of response opera-
tions and public services. Federal envi-
ronmental responders, on-scene coor-
dinators and other officials need timely 
and cost-effective decontamination op-
tions, which will enable contamination 
responders to return cleanup sites to a 
usable state.
Not every technology will be applica-
ble to a specific incident or available 
at a specific site when needed. Certain 
technologies are more effective, but 
not widely available; others are less ef-
fective, but more widely available. 
To ensure decision-makers have a di-
verse technology toolbox, researchers 
at the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, in collaboration with the De-
partment of Homeland Security, con-
ducted a wide-area urban radiological 
contaminant mitigation and cleanup 
technology demonstration. The event 
replicated an urban radiological inci-
dent in order to train researchers and 
local, state and federal decision-mak-
ers on how to determine appropriate 
containment, decontamination and re-
covery guidelines. 
Researchers demonstrated a toolbox 
of options to mitigate and decontam-
inate urban, wide-area radiological 
contamination stemming from an event 
such as a dirty bomb detonation or nu-
clear power plant accident. While or-
ganizers did not use live radionuclides 
in this operational demonstration, they 
assessed all technologies for their 
cleanup efficacy using radionuclides 
in controlled laboratory settings. The 
demonstration marked the first large-
scale testing of the technologies, iden-
tifying additional research gaps and 
transitioning research findings to the 
end-user community. 
The operational demonstration exam-
ined a number of innovative solutions. 
The mitigation technology portion of 
the demo included building and vehicle 
decontamination technologies and par-
ticle and liquid containment strategies. 
Organizers also demonstrated five 
technologies for wide-area radiological 
decontamination, including chemical 
foam solutions, strippable coatings and 
gels. Wastewater treatment, a tool for 
waste management, was also demon-
strated. Summaries of highlights relat-
ed to these three elements follow.  
Mitigation Technologies 
To help combat the problem of track-
ing radioactive materials out of a con-
taminated area by foot or by vehicles, 
researchers used fluorescent particles 
to test materials that could potentially 
reduce the spread of contamination. 
Using chemical wash solutions with ad-
ditives such as foam, local firefighters 
demonstrated how to wash radiological 
contaminants off an urban brick build-
ing and off vehicles potentially used by 
early responders. 
Decontamination 
Technologies 
Responders demonstrated gels and 
strippable coatings designed to trap ra-
dioactive contaminants and then peel, 
vacuum or wash off of buildings, there-
by minimizing waste streams. These 
technologies were separately demon-
strated on small sections of other urban 
materials, such as granite, marble and 
limestone, which are often found in ur-
ban building settings.
Waste Management 
Waste management, a potential stum-
bling block during radiological re-
sponse, was an important part of the 
demonstrations as well. A wastewater 
containment system coupled to a treat-
ment trailer designed to treat wastewa-
ter was on-site. Treatment of wastewa-
ter during decontamination operations 
may be essential for reuse, as billions 
of gallons of water could be used if a 
large portion of a city is contaminated. 
Recycling water could lessen the bur-
den on the city’s water supply and po-
tentially reduce the amount of radioac-
tive wastewater to be disposed.
EPA And dHS 
PArtnEr in rAdiAtion 
dEcontAminAtion 
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By: Gregory Sayles, Ph.D.
Dr. Gregory Sayles directs the EPA’s homeland security research. The research program supports 
the EPA’s mission by striving to improve drinking water system resilience; characterization of con-
tamination; cleanup of contaminated wide areas including water systems; and management of con-
taminated waste materials. The program addresses radiological, chemical and biological threats. 
Dr. Sayles has conducted and managed research at the EPA for 25 years. He earned his Ph.D. in 
chemical engineering from North Carolina State University. He leads the research program from the 
EPA’s laboratory in Cincinnati, Ohio.
To see more about the demonstration 
please visit: https://youtu.be/IV7N-
2jWm6js
For more information about this re-
search, please visit: www.epa.gov/
hsresearch
To learn more about our researchers:
• Dr. Sang Don Lee https://youtu.
be/_MTpjh3OG6k
• Dr. Paul Lemieux https://youtu.
be/-dHsAlmoC5Q
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Image demonstrates wide-area radiological decontami-
nation. (Image provided by the EPA/Released)
The Homeland Defense and Security Information Analysis Center received a request for research and 
analysis of alternative methods for 
water purification to support de-
ployed troops. HDIAC provided a 
comparative data analysis, as well 
as cost-benefit analyses of water 
purification systems using innova-
tive technologies in materials sci-
ence, nanoparticles, graphene and 
hybrid techniques.
Background Information
Managing clean water systems is 
challenging for forward operating 
bases in remote and underdevel-
oped locations. Some FOBs lack 
access to potable water and raw 
water sources may contain chemi-
cal or biological agents that require 
treatment before use. [1] Water sup-
plies in the Middle East are espe-
cially important, as troops in desert 
areas must drink more water in an 
area where the resource is scarc-
er. [2] Therefore, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense spends more than 
$500,000 per day transporting and 
supplying 20,000 troops with bottled 
water. [1] 
Enemy combatants also target sup-
ply convoys, making the logistics of 
importing bottled water dangerous 
to the warfighter. [3] During the 2007 
fiscal year, the total casualties oc-
curring during water resupply con-
voys numbered 15 in Afghanistan 
and 53 in Iraq. [4] Technologies in 
water filtration can meet the needs 
of FOBs while reducing operational 
costs, improving sustainability and 
reducing the need for water con-
voys. [5] 
DoD Requirements
In order to adopt alternative water 
filtration technologies, the DoD’s 
unique requirements must be con-
sidered. One requirement is a whol-
ly mobile system, which is neces-
sary for troops on the move. Current 
military iterations of water filtration 
systems, such as the Lightweight 
Water Purification System and Tac-
tical Water Purification System are 
semi-mobile, but require a truck or 
Humvee for transportation. [1] Larg-
er systems, such as the Reverse 
Osmosis Water Purification Unit, 
rely on diesel generators; [6] there-
by increasing demands on addition-
al energy resources and increasing 
the weight of the systems, which 
decreases mobility. Larger filtration 
systems can remove a wider variety 
of contaminants than their smaller 
counterparts, [7] which may lack 
the ability to remove dissolved salts, 
such as lead or mercury; however, 
these systems are immobile. [7] 
For the DoD, an ideal system could 
remove a variety of contaminants 
while remaining compact enough 
for small forces to transport. Cost-
ly operations to bring water to the 
troops prompts military research 
labs to develop alternative systems 
capable of filtering and desalinating 
water sources in the Middle East, 
Pacific Islands and anywhere troops 
are deployed. [7]
Systems
Each water filtration system’s ef-
fectiveness is largely dependent on 
its filters. Many water purification 
systems fielded by the U.S. military 
use reverse osmosis in combination 
with carbon, ceramic, sand or diato-
maceous earth filters. [8,9] Reverse 
osmosis can remove dissolved ma-
terials as small as .001 microns by 
filtering the water through a semi-
permeable membrane. [8] Addition-
al filtration methods vary by system, 
but can include carbon and ion ex-
change filters to remove chemical 
and nuclear agents [8] and ultravio-
let light to kill microorganisms. [10,7] 
Although these systems prove ef-
fective at removing contaminants, 
only one system, the Small Unit Wa-
ter Purification System,  possesses 
high levels of filtration while remain-
ing mobile. The SUWPS produces 
up to 750 gallons of decontaminat-
ed and desalinated water daily and 
weighs only 80 pounds. [10] Despite 
its advanced capabilities, the SU-
WPS’ intricate construction and del-
icate system housing makes fielding 
problematic. [7]
One possible solution to increas-
ing filtration efficiency in a portable 
system is introducing nanoparticle 
filters. Carbon nanoparticles are 
lightweight, abundant and inexpen-
sive. [11] Nanoparticles possess a 
large surface area and when com-
bined with gold and/or silver ions 
are capable of destroying microbes, 
bacteria, viruses, mercury and other 
chemical contaminants.  [12]
Carbon nanotubes, which allow wa-
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ter to pass through while rejecting most 
salts, ions and pollutants, are another 
possibility. [13] While carbon nanotubes 
are effective at removing heavy metals, 
bacteria, viruses, cyanobacterial toxins 
and metalloids, [12] the health risks 
and environmental effects of carbon 
nanotubes require further study before 
implementation in water filtration. [14] 
Carbon nanotubes are effective in re-
moving a wide range of contaminants, 
thus their use could replace multiple 
filters. [12] Multi-filtration capabilities 
paired with affordability, availability and 
compact size, makes carbon nanotube 
filter integration a technology worth in-
tegrating into DoD water security stra-
tegic plan.
Conclusion and 
Recommendations
HDIAC’s analysis provides the DoD 
an objective approach to emerging 
technologies in water filtration through 
breakthroughs in materials sciences. 
Current military water purification sys-
tems require improvements in mobility 
and filtration capabilities to meet the 
needs of the warfighter. Carbon nano-
materials incorporated into existing 
systems and developed into new water 
filtration systems will enable the DoD 
to ensure water security at FOBs and 
other DoD installations.
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Introduction
Special Operations Forces work in demanding, high-risk environments. The sol-diers train to succeed in the most complex missions; they are prepared to pro-vide expert support for national objectives; and must be capable of handling any situation from counterterrorism to civil affairs operations. [1]
Because of the extremes faced by special operators, they need to be both equipped with 
the best technology and creative in their responses. “In particular … creativity is the 
ability to rapidly change the operational method to something different from what con-
ventional forces can use: the ability to change the game in the middle of the game.” [2]
On the home front, the United States Special Operations Command, which supports the 
Global Combatant Commands’ operations by providing Special Operations Forces, [3] 
continuously pursues the latest technological innovations to increase its effectiveness 
for the warfighter. By furthering developments in satellite communications and weapons 
systems to advancing components in the Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit, USSO-
COM fosters a culture that embraces and supports innovation in research, devel-
opment and acquisition programs to meet the demanding needs of the special 
operator.
SOFWERX
Supporting the emphasis on innovation led to a partnership establishing the 
SOFWERX, an unclassified, open collaboration facility, designed to bring 
non-traditional partners from industry, academia and the government to-
gether to work on USSOCOM’s most challenging problems. 
The 10,000 square foot facility serves as an incubator for inno-
vative thinking by creating an interactive venue for “return 
on collisions” of untapped ideas and partnerships. The 
future for the SOFWERX concept includes a rapid 
By: Jessica Hill
HDIAC BCO
prototyping/proof of concept facility, which is under 
development near the original SOFWERX facility. 
The advancements conceived and developed during 
events and work sessions at the SOFWERX facility 
will benefit USSOCOM by serving to better inform 
future technical development, engineering decisions 
and provide a center for future innovation initiatives. 
Developing non-traditional relationships, when ce-
mented with divergent thought and design thinking, 
will create a forum for innovation and accelerating 
technologies to USSOCOM. And, as an off-base facil-
ity, it is easier for collaborators to attend meetings, 
than if they took place at USSOCOM’s headquarters 
at MacDill Air Force Base. [4]
Utilizing SOFWERX will help USSOCOM overcome fu-
ture challenges by continuing to attract the brightest 
minds and alternative approaches. These continuing 
relationships will allow USSOCOM to increase its in-
novation and development speed, flatten information 
and influence initiatives across the enterprise. US-
SOCOM released Requests for Information seeking 
technological capabilities that can see through walls, 
disable a car, map a room and remotely track a per-
son’s health. [5,6]
Tactical Assault Light 
Operator Suit
In August 2013, USSOCOM initiated a vision for a 
next-generation, technologically advanced combat 
operator suit to better protect Special Operations 
Force operators conducting high-risk missions. A 
Joint Acquisition Task Force brought operators, 
engineers and acquisition professionals togeth-
er on the same team with a mission to deliver a 
next-generation combat suit via innovative ac-
quisition processes such as rapid prototyp-
ing, collaboration with non-traditional part-
ners and prize challenges. The TALOS 
roadmap consists of building incre-
mental exoskeleton prototypes with 
increased levels of subsystem inte-
gration leading to the initial com-
bat suit prototype scheduled for 
August 2018 delivery. 
TALOS was chartered to ex-
plore and catalyze a rev-
olutionary integration of 
advanced technology to pro-
vide comprehensive ballistic 
protection, peerless tactical 
capabilities and ultimately 
to enhance the strategic ef-
fectiveness of the Special 
Operations Forces opera-
tor of the future. When the 
TALOS concept was intro-
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duced via a Request for Information, 
nine aspects, including advanced 
armor, power generation, thermal 
management and embedded medi-
cal monitoring were included. [7]
Currently, armor is required to pro-
tect approximately 20 percent of 
the body (including head); however, 
TALOS anticipates full body pro-
tection. [8] This causes numerous 
challenges, including minimizing 
the weight of the armor required for 
whole body protection. [8] 
Distinct functional areas com-
prise the TALOS project. Sev-
eral of these functional areas 
utilize SOFWERX to generate in-
novative solutions to TALOS trials. 
The primary functional areas con-
ducting work at the SOFWERX fa-
cility are Operator Interface/Visual 
Augmentation Systems, for which 
there are test beds and worksta-
tions, as well as Survivability, for 
which there have been several ar-
mor design prototyping events. The 
OI/VAS functional area will lead the 
Helmet Integration effort for TALOS, 
some of which will take place at the 
SOFWERX facility. However, SOF-
WERX is currently only a venue to 
progress on components internal to 
the TALOS helmet. 
In terms of internal helmet com-
ponents, SOFWERX hosted a Fall 
2015 Display Pipeline 
Series, which brought 
in players from indus-
try, government and 
academia, to integrate 
components of the Visual 
Augmentation System and 
computing architecture. 
For example, the hel-
met needs to pro-
vide visual 
screens 
with 
no latency 
problems. [9] 
This process will 
continue going forward. 
During these design efforts, Spe-
cial Operations Forces operators 
are onsite. The constant inclusion 
of operator input is imperative to the 
success of TALOS. Operators are 
able to provide real time feedback 
and insights on engineer develop-
ments to ensure tactical relevancy. 
 
The TALOS Power/Energy function-
al areas is not currently evaluating 
hardware at SOFWERX. Challeng-
es for the TALOS power source in-
clude ruggedization and adapting 
commercial technologies to military 
requirements. TALOS is also moni-
toring industry and national labora-
tory efforts for potential future inte-
gration. 
USSOCOM 
will continue 
discussing chal-
lenges and solutions to TALOS at 
the 2016 Special Operations Forces 
Industry Conference. Each day con-
ference attendees will be able to of-
fer potential solutions to challenges 
faced in developing TALOS. [10]
Prometheus
Cube Satellites, or nanosatellites, 
are miniature satellites, only about 
four inches long and three pounds. 
[11] The satellites launch into space 
in clusters or constellations [11] 
for use by academia, industry and 
government agencies to conduct 
high-speed communication, data 
sensitive scientific exploration and 
educational research. [12] CubeSat 
technology development has been 
public, which encourages engi-
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Prometheus is a CubeSat constellation developed by 
Los Alamos National Laboratory for USSOCOM. (Im-
age provided by USSOCOM/Released)
Article continues on page 12
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The TALOS exoskeleton is under development 
by USSOCOM and will better protect Special 
Operations Force operators in high-risk mis-
sions. (Photo by Conrad Johnson, RDECOM 
Public Affairs/Released)
The Military Open Source Software chap-ter cosponsored the first Hackathon at SOFWERX and presented participants with four potential challenges:
 
• Open Source Intelligence Framework: Use 
open source software and open standards to 
create an infrastructure to scrape, process (in-
cluding text extraction), structure and persist 
OSINT data. 
• Ensuring Cloud Security of Server Instances: 
Using a public cloud provider (e.g., Amazon, 
Microsoft, Google, Rackspace, etc.), install and 
configure a standard Windows 12 and/or Linux 
system. Automate (to the degree feasible) the 
actions to check and configure the server(s) 
to ensure they are installed and operating se-
curely to protect the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of data. Provide a checklist for 
procedures that cannot be easily automated.
• Common Operating Model: Starting with Tac-
Map as the software base, demonstrate how 
using 3D models of urban terrain can support 
real-time visualization of the location and sta-
tus of unit element (including drones). Feel 
free to add any other useful HUD-oriented data 
that might be useful for tactical urban opera-
tions.
• 3D Model Visualization and Collaboration: 
Use existing open source software frame-
works to build a 3D multi-modal collaboration 
neers, hobbyists and students to 
engage in design and capability 
idea development. [13] The tech-
nology also uses commercial off-
the-shelf electronics, which helps 
mitigate costs. [14]
Prometheus is a USSOCOM 
CubeSat constellation developed 
by Los Alamos National Labora-
tory [15] to explore the viability of 
using nanosatellite con-
stellations to meet 
existing Special Op-
erations Forces mission require-
ments. Using the Prometheus 
satellites, special operators will 
be able to transfer audio, video 
and data files from man-portable, 
low profile, remotely located field 
units to deployable ground sta-
tions terminals using over-the-
horizon satellite communications. 
Because the Prometheus proj-
ect began prior to SOFWERX, 
work on the technical challenges 
(such as minimizing the satellite’s 
weight and reducing the num-
ber of parts) began else-
where. [12] However, 
USSOCOM continues 
to evaluate how the 
Prometheus project 
can benefit from SOF-
WERX’s unique envi-
ronment. 
One trial faced by the 
team developing Pro-
metheus centered on 
trying to package 
communications 
e l e c t r o n i c s , 
a n t e n n a s 
and suf-
f i c i e n t 
p o w e r 
into a 1.5U (10cm x 10 cm x 15 cm) 
package. Working within the size 
constraints as well as projected 
development and fielding budgets 
is an innovation challenge. Expos-
ing multiple developers to the Pro-
metheus technology in the SOF-
WERX collaboration environment 
could help USSOCOM tackle the 
communication challenges and 
develop additional capabilities for 
the satellites.
 
Los Alamos National Security, in 
support of its USSOCOM mission, 
launched the eight-nanosatellite 
Prometheus constellation into or-
bit in 2013. [16] After launch, the 
satellites successfully commu-
nicated with controllers on the 
ground. [17]
Prometheus is one of a handful 
of initiatives geared toward im-
proving space capability respon-
siveness, communications and 
situational awareness for the war-
fighter. Prometheus will assist in 
providing SOCOM the information 
needed to assess and evaluate 
the approach, technology, opera-
tional utility, costs and concept of 
operations for implementing the 
CubeSat system. ■
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environment. The environment should allow the abili-
ty to input models into a model database, search, or-
ganize and view models and collaborate with others 
on the model whereby “control” of the model can be 
passed between participants (like the “presenter” sta-
tus in a web conference), so that the “presenter” can 
bring models together, change orientation, etc. to visu-
ally demonstrate model requirements to viewers. 
For this challenge, the winning Hackathon team (Team 
Shudder) created a novel heads up display that in-
tegrated data from satellite feeds to show what was 
behind walls or buildings or was otherwise obstruct-
ed from the operator’s view. Their concept and de-
sign was so novel USSOCOM invited the team back 
to participate in a heads up display technology sprint 
for TALOS. This is an example of the unique input and 
non-traditional performer USSOCOM is attempting to 
attract using open collaboration and SOFWERX.
The next Hackathon is planned for May 20-22, 2016 – 
the weekend before USSOCOM’s Special Operations 
Forces Industry Conference and International Special 
Operations Forces week. It will include partnerships 
with Air Force Research Lab and organizations from 
the intelligence community, and feature challenges in 
the international collaboration and partnering space. 
In addition, USSOCOM added monthly “mini-hacks” 
to allow Hackathon participants to continue working 
together on USSOCOM problems, and build further on 
the relationships formed during the other events.
By: David J. Robertson, Ph.D. 
& Mike Burton, Ph.D.
Familiar Face Recognition
A person’s ability to recognize familiar faces across a wide range of viewing conditions is one of the most impressive 
facets of human cognition. As shown 
in Figure 1, it is easy to conclude, for 
a known individual, that each image in 
the set shows the same person (Brit-
ish Prime Minister David Cameron), 
despite a wide range of variation in 
viewing angle, physical appearance, 
camera and lighting. In fact, familiar 
face recognition performance is often 
at or near ceiling level, even when the 
images are of poor quality [1] or ar-
tificially distorted. [2] At first glance, 
the aptitude for familiar face recog-
nition may suggest a similar level of 
expertise for the recognition of unfa-
miliar faces, thus the reliance on face-
to-photo ID for identity verification. 
[3] This is not the case, as recent re-
search shows people are surprisingly 
poor at recognizing new instances of 
an unfamiliar person. 
The poor recognition of unfamiliar fac-
es is a concern for the United States. 
Many preliminary screenings involve 
facial recognition by security agents. 
In order for this method to be effec-
tive, more robust training for security 
agents needs to be established. The 
Department of Defense utilizes fa-
cial and iris recognition technologies 
in order to eliminate human error in 
identifying persons of interest during 
surveillance operations. [4] DoD 
guidelines should be implemented by 
security agent guidance programs to 
ensure best practices in identification 
of potential threats. 
Unfamiliar Face 
Recognition: Studies on the 
General Population
The Glasgow Face Matching Test [5] 
is a well-established measure of un-
familiar face recognition performance. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, this simple 
psychometric test requires participants 
to decide whether pairs of unfamiliar 
faces show two instances of the same 
person (taken seconds apart using dif-
ferent cameras) or two different peo-
ple. The GFMT captures the real life 
1-1 matching situations encountered 
on a daily basis by passport control of-
ficers (i.e. matching a face to a pass-
port photo) and military personnel (i.e. 
matching a face image captured from 
surveillance footage to images held on 
file). In the GFMT, viewers are not re-
quired to remember anything and can 
take as long as they like to make their 
decisions. 
 As seen in Figure 2, the GFMT trials 
use high quality front-facing images. 
Despite this, accuracy on this task 
is generally poor with error rates be-
tween 15 and 20 percent being the 
norm across hundreds of participants 
tested. Even the lower end of the esti-
mate, 15 percent, is a non-trivial level 
of error in many circumstances. For 
example, millions of international pas-
sengers pass through airports each 
day. If this error rate were similar in 
professional groups (see next section) 
it would be unacceptably high. 
Another striking example of poor 
performance in a test of unfamiliar 
face recognition was modeled on an 
old-fashioned police line-up scenario 
involving a series of one-to-ten unfa-
miliar face matching arrays. [6] The 
task was intended to emulate the best-
case scenario for identifying images 
captured on a security video. As seen 
in Figure 3(a), participants were pre-
sented with a single high quality image 
of a ‘suspect’ taken from video foot-
age and an array of 10 face images. 
Participants decided whether the sus-
pect was present in the array, and if 
present, attempted to pick out the cor-
rect image. Despite using high quality 
images and video stills taken on the 
same day, in a similar pose and in op-
timal lighting conditions, error rates on 
this task were unacceptably high, at 
30 percent on average. Performance 
dropped further with lower quality sur-
veillance video. [7] 
Researchers replicated this level of er-
ror using the same task and extended 
the findings to include the effects of 
race or ethnicity. [8] Using the same 
Figure 1. Ambient photos of the same face (U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron). All 
images used under Creative Commons or Open Government License. (Released) 
Figure 2. An example of two trials from 
the Glasgow Face Matching Test. The 
top pair shows two instances of the 
same person (match trial), the bottom 
pair shows two different people (mis-
match trial).  (Released)
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matching task, [6] the researchers 
asked U.K. and Egyptian participants 
to complete the one-to-ten task using 
faces of people from the U.K. and 
from Egypt. [8] When participants 
performed the recognition test with 
faces from their own ethnic group 
(e.g., U.K. participant using U.K. face 
arrays), error rates were in line with 
those in earlier studies. [6,8] Howev-
er, when participants were required to 
match faces from an opposite ethnic 
background, (e.g., U.K. participant 
using Egyptian face arrays; see Fig-
ure 3b) error rates rose to 40 percent. 
This is known as the ‘other race ef-
fect’ and is of particular importance 
considering a proportion of people 
attempting passport fraud or under 
military surveillance are likely to be 
unfamiliar other race individuals. 
Hence, accurate recognition of unfa-
miliar individuals for the purposes of 
detecting passport ID fraud or for mili-
tary surveillance may be more difficult 
when the person is a foreign national. 
The above studies provide insight 
into laboratory tests of unfamiliar face 
recognition. One criticism of these 
findings is that they focus on match-
ing face photographs, whereas in the 
real world accurate matching involves 
real faces. Research shows, howev-
er, that matching a face photo to the 
face of a live person is just as difficult 
and error-prone as matching face im-
ages. For example, one study report-
ed an error rate of 17 percent when 
participants were asked to match re-
cent photos to live faces. [9] A later 
study reported more than 30 percent 
of participants made identification 
errors when asked to match recent 
high quality closed-circuit television 
images to a live defendant in a court-
room scenario study. [10] Unfamiliar 
face recognition is just as bad in real 
life as it is when matching two pho-
tos. 
Unfamiliar Face 
Recognition: Studies on 
Specialists
The laboratory-based studies de-
scribed above provide important 
insights into the accuracy of unfa-
miliar face recognition. However, 
these studies were performed using 
non-specialist viewers from the gen-
eral population. While study results 
are informative, it is important to 
know whether people who carry out 
these tasks professionally are able 
to perform more accurately than un-
trained viewers. 
A seminal study tested whether the 
inclusion of a face photo on credit 
cards would reduce fraud. [11] The 
study used real supermarket cashiers 
who routinely check photo-ID cards 
to prevent the sale of age-restricted 
goods, such as cigarettes 
and alcohol. Remark-
ably, it was reported that 
the retail staff accepted 
fraudulent photo credit 
cards (i.e. the photo did 
not depict the bearer) as 
genuine in 50 percent of 
trials. It is striking that this 
performance could be so 
poor, given that matching 
Figure 3(a). An example of a one-to-
ten matching trial from Reference 6. 
In this example, the suspect pictured 
above the array is not present in the 
line-up below. Figure 3(b). An exam-
ple of a one-to-ten matching trial from 
Reference 8. In this example, the sus-
pect is present in the array, at position 
number 10. (Released) 
Figure 4. Examples of the 
images used in Reference 
1: A still from a CCTV vid-
eo (left) and a high quality 
face photo (right). (Re-
leased)
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faces to photo-ID cards is 
an important part of the job. 
While it could be argued that 
retail stores do not have the 
resources to provide training 
in photo-ID verification, this 
is not a criticism that can be 
leveled at studies involving 
police officers or passport of-
ficials, described next. 
U.K. Police Officers
Researchers tested whether 
a group of U.K. police offi-
cers, with experience in fo-
rensic identification, would 
perform better than a group 
of untrained university stu-
dents on a test of unfamiliar 
face recognition. [1] As seen in Figure 
4, participants were required to view 
low quality video clips of individuals 
entering a building. They were told that 
they would later be asked to identify 
these people. The participants looked 
at high quality face photos and were 
asked to rate how confident they were 
that these individuals had been present 
in the video clips. 
The results of the study showed that 
the police officers performed very poor-
ly on this task, and in fact, did no bet-
ter than the group of students. Hence, 
any training the officers had in forensic 
identification appeared to provide no 
assistance when it came to recognizing 
new instances of an unfamiliar face. 
Australian Passport Officials
A recent major study of unfamiliar face 
recognition in Australian passport offi-
cers, conducted in collaboration with 
the Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs, asked 30 passport officers 
to decide whether a passport photo 
matched the face of a person standing 
in front of them. [12] The study found 
passport officials incorrectly accepted 
a fake passport photo as genuine in 
14 percent of trials. Interestingly, the 
findings also showed no relationship 
between employment duration/experi-
ence and accuracy on this task, as il-
lustrated in Figure 5. That is, those who 
had 20 years’ experience at the pass-
port office were no more likely to be ac-
curate than those who had just started 
working with the service. 
As the figure shows, there were very 
large individual differences between of-
ficers. In fact, this is the standard find-
ing—some people consistently perform 
better at face tasks than others. Once 
again, the important point here is, in 
another specialist group, professional 
training and experience does not ap-
pear to lead to more accurate unfamil-
iar face recognition. 
While the incidence of attempted pass-
port fraud is very low, researchers re-
cently showed that this, in itself, leads 
to an additional source of error. [13] In a 
phenomenon known as the low preva-
lence effect, researchers found that de-
tecting unfamiliar mismatch face pairs 
was much poorer when they occurred 
on 10 percent of trials in comparison to 
50 percent of trials. These findings sug-
gest that a lack of familiarity with travel-
ers and the low incidence of attempted 
passport fraud present major security 
risks at border control points. 
How Can We Improve 
Unfamiliar Face Recognition 
Performance?
Based on the experimental evidence 
outlined above, it is clear that unfamiliar 
face recognition is a difficult task which 
is highly prone to error. This is the case 
regardless of whether the task involves 
photos or real faces, and whether it in-
volves professional or untrained view-
ers. For the foresee-
able future, reliance 
on face recognition 
for ID verification will 
continue at many bor-
der control points and 
in military operations. 
Consequently, recent 
research focused on 
ways to improve hu-
man performance in this domain. 
Selection 
As seen in Figure 5, researchers 
showed that recognition performance 
did not relate to occupational experi-
ence or years in employment; some in-
dividuals were simply better than others 
at this task. [12] This finding suggests 
that using an established test, such as 
the GFMT, [5] could help select high 
performing people for jobs in which ac-
curate unfamiliar face recognition is a 
critical component of the job.
 
Paired Decision Making
Research shows that performance 
on recognition tests can be improved 
when participants work together and 
come to a judgment in pairs. [14] 
Across four experiments, the study 
tested unfamiliar face recognition indi-
vidually (pre-test), as pairs (paired-test) 
and again individually (post-tests). The 
authors report that participants were 
more accurate when they made their 
judgments in pairs than individually. 
Furthermore, those who started with 
low performance showed a lasting ben-
efit of having worked in pairs, suggest-
ing that this type of procedure may be 
a particularly effective training method.
Multi-Photo ID
A different approach to improving unfa-
miliar face matching focuses on the ID 
document itself. The selection of pho-
tos for passports is a complex process, 
Figure 5. Unfamiliar 
face recognition accu-
racy (live face-passport 
photo) for Australian 
passport office staff 
presented as a function 
of employment dura-
tion. [12] (Released)
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and one that differs between coun-
tries. Despite rather strict rules about 
the format required for these photos, 
people often comment that their IDs 
look rather unlike them. What modern 
research makes clear is that a single 
instance of a person can never form 
a true representation of their appear-
ance. One suggestion is that the key 
to improving unfamiliar face recogni-
tion is learning how an individual var-
ies across a naturally occurring set of 
instances. In other words, familiarity 
is shorthand for learning an individu-
al’s idiosyncratic variation in appear-
ance. [15] It would be possible to 
achieve this for photo-ID by increas-
ing the number of photos required 
on an ID document. Researchers re-
ported that unfamiliar face matching 
performance significantly improved 
when mock 
ID cards con-
tained two, 
three or four 
photo arrays 
(see Figure 
6). [16] So, 
a relatively 
small increase 
in the number 
of photos con-
tained on an 
ID card could 
reduce the error found with single im-
age identity documents.
 
Automatic Face 
Recognition
Due to recent technological advanc-
es, there has been an increase in 
the use of automatic face recognition 
systems at airports, in military surveil-
lance operations and even in social 
media (e.g., Facebook). Using the 
example of implementing electron-
ic facial recognition gates (e-gates) 
at airports across the world, the ex-
pectation is these machines would 
remove the level of human error re-
ported in the above passport officers’ 
study. However, there is evidence 
to suggest that machine recognition 
systems are not providing the level 
of performance claimed by the de-
velopers. [17] Indeed, a recent report 
by the U.K. Inspectorate of Borders 
questioned the level of security pro-
vided by the e-gates. 
The report cited an example in which 
a married couple was able to acci-
dentally swap their passports and still 
make it through the e-gate system. 
Despite these systems performing 
well in benchmark tests, they rou-
tinely perform poorly in real world 
settings. [18] In the next section, we 
outline research which shows that 
current machine recognition perfor-
mance can improve without any alter-
ations to the algorithm.
Improving Automatic 
Face Recognition
No machine recognition system cur-
rently emulates the level of recogni-
tion accuracy found in humans when 
dealing with familiar faces. As noted 
above, familiar viewers are able to 
recognize photos of someone they 
know despite changes in lighting, 
camera characteristics, pose, ex-
pression and age. Unfamiliar face 
recognition in humans and machines 
is thought to be so poor precisely 
because these systems do not have 
Figure 6. An example of the face matching arrays from 
reference 12. A single face is presented to the left, the 
array of photos to the right. Participants decide if the 
face on the left matches the photo(s) on the right. The 
example arrays showing one and three photos show the 
same person (match trials), while arrays showing 2 and 
4 photos show different people (mismatch trials). (Re-
leased)
Figure 7. Individual images of the same person can look very different. Averaging these together produces a stable im-
age, which will match a much wider range of the user’s face and improve security.  (Released)
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access to ways in which an individual’s 
appearance varies. Previous research 
suggests the brain may become famil-
iar with a person by storing many differ-
ent instances of them in memory. [19] 
However, in contrast, another study 
proposed that people may store an ab-
stract representation of a person’s face 
which retains identity specific informa-
tion and discards irrelevant information 
which varies across images (e.g., light-
ing etc.). [20] This abstract represen-
tation, essentially a morph of different 
images, is called a face average and 
an example can be seen in Figure 7.
In an effort to track travel of non-U.S. 
citizens to the United States, the U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection uses 
biometric technology at the border to 
capture face and iris scans of all indi-
viduals entering or exiting the country. 
[21] Non-U.S. citizens traveling to the 
United States also require a visa that 
implements biometric identifiers, such 
as fingerprint scans, as well as a digital 
photo, unless they are part of the Visa 
Waiver Program. [22] This will allow 
the CBP to utilize a database instead 
of facial recognition, which is prone to 
human error. Facial recognition alone 
has proven to be an unreliable source 
and with the new data the CBP is col-
lecting, it will be able to track persons 
of interest and foreign travel to ensure 
safety. [23]
To protect sensitive information, as 
well as the homeland, federal agencies 
issue identification cards containing 
biometric data to federal employees 
and contractors. [24,25] This process 
makes it more difficult for unauthorized 
individuals to access secure facilities. 
Additionally, the use of stolen or coun-
terfeited badges no longer poses a 
threat without the matching biometrics 
of the personnel. A multimodal method 
of detection is the most robust.
Research showed that face averages 
could be used to improve an automat-
ic face recognition system. [20] This 
study assessed the performance of an 
online version of the then industry stan-
Figure 9. Images of the six different locations used in Reference 27 to test the effectiveness of face averages. (Released)
Figure 8. Shows the mean automatic face recognition accuracy when storing a 
person’s face average (green) compared to an individual image of them (blue). 
Performance is shown for each of the six testing locations. (Released)
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Bdard recognition system, FaceVACS. 
This system contained a large data-
base of celebrity face photographs, 
(more than 30,000 images and more 
than 3,000 celebrities) which varied 
considerably in illumination, pose, fa-
cial expression, age and image qual-
ity. Users would upload a photo and 
the system would return the closest 
matching image in its database. 
When the researchers uploaded indi-
vidual images of different celebrities, 
they found the system would only 
return another picture of the correct 
identity on 54 percent of occasions 
[26] – a rather poor level of perfor-
mance. However, when celebrities’ 
face averages were uploaded, the 
system achieved perfect levels of 
performance (100 percent accuracy). 
This provided clear evidence that us-
ing a person’s face average, rather 
than an instance of them, could dra-
matically improve machine recogni-
tion without an alteration to the algo-
rithm.
While some research established the 
face average advantage using pho-
to-to-photo matching, [26] a more 
recent study assessed whether the 
advantage remained when dealing 
with the recognition of real faces. 
[27] This study used the ‘face-un-
lock’ security system in the Samsung 
Galaxy smartphone. This system al-
lows users to store an image of their 
face in the phone’s memory, which 
can be used to recognize the user 
and allow access as an alternative 
to passcodes. Researchers reported 
that when they stored a person’s face 
average rather than an instance of 
them, real face recognition rates were 
significantly increased, sometimes to 
perfect levels of performance as seen 
in Figure 8. [27] Impressively, this ef-
fect held across a variety of everyday 
environmental conditions, including 
outdoors, as seen in Figure 9. 
In summary, face averages have 
been shown to improve machine rec-
ognition performance both with face 
photos and real faces. This technique 
could be particularly important to po-
lice or military operations, which are 
required to match a suspect or sur-
veillance target to face photos held 
on a large database. Additionally, if 
face averages replaced individual 
photos on passports, e-gate security 
systems may perform better than they 
currently do. 
Conclusions
This article presents experimental ev-
idence, which shows that unfamiliar 
face recognition is a difficult task and 
one that is highly prone to error. De-
spite this, reliance on face photos for 
identity verification in domains with 
direct implications for national securi-
ty continues. Research has identified 
several ways of improving human 
and machine face recognition. Oth-
er forms of biometric security, such 
as the iris scan, have the potential to 
replace face photo-ID in the future. 
However, many agencies around the 
world prefer to use faces for identifi-
cation, possibly because their use is 
relatively unobtrusive, and appears 
natural. This article shows the limita-
tions of this reliance. 
The difficulty in recognizing unfamil-
iar faces is a security concern for the 
United States and requires increased 
use of biometric data for more accu-
rate identification. This is especially 
critical when identifying individuals 
privy to sensitive information, non-cit-
izens entering or leaving the United 
States, as well as criminals or terror-
ists. Incorrect identification of these 
individuals leaves the United States 
vulnerable. 
The DoD fields an Automated Bio-
metric Identification System to house 
and share biometric data. Originally 
developed for Operation Iraqi Free-
dom and Operation Enduring Free-
dom, ABIS is used to identify persons 
of interest that have a prior criminal 
history and are deemed as potential 
threats to U.S. forces. [28] In order to 
enable intelligence sharing amongst 
federal agencies, information within 
this system is shared with interagen-
cy partners like the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and external partners 
that include the CBP and U.S. Citi-
zenship and Immigration Services. 
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The Homeland Defense and Security Informa-tion Analysis Center received a request for research and analysis of safety culture as-sessments and incident rates within the U.S. 
pipeline industry. HDIAC highlighted the most com-
monly occurring safety incidents in the pipeline in-
dustry over the last 10 years and provided possible 
solutions for reducing occurrences of multiple types of 
safety incidents. In addition, HDIAC compiled tables 
to display the most common incident types alongside 
their total property damage costs by year. Also provid-
ed in the inquiry were tables showcasing companies 
with the most safety violations over the last 10 years, 
measured by the total number of corrective action 
orders received and a list of pipeline companies that 
carried out safety culture assessments. 
Background
In 2013, the United States contained 1.7 million miles 
of oil and gas pipeline. [1] The vast network of oil and 
gas pipelines makes incident prevention difficult as 
shown by the recent increase in reported safety in-
cidents for 2015. [2] Prevention becomes more chal-
lenging due to the varied types of safety concerns 
and incidents. Equipment failures, corrosion, incorrect 
operation, excavation and natural and outside forces 
are the most costly and commonly occurring safety 
concerns for the pipelines. [2]
Safety incidents can result in injury or loss of life, as 
well as significant property damage. [2] The Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration pro-
motes safer operating procedures through the use 
of enforcement actions to reduce the occurrence of 
safety incidents. Corrective action orders, the stron-
gest enforcement action issued by the PHMSA, focus 
on “urgent situations arising out of an accident, spill, 
or other significant, immediate, or imminent safety or 
environmental concern.” [3] From 2005-2014, PHMSA 
issued 77 corrective action orders, [4] with an average 
of 1.79 corrective action orders by company. [4] 
Infrastructure Weakness and Damage
More than 100,000 miles of pipelines built during or 
prior to the 1930s still exist in the United States. [5] 
These dated lines were constructed with leak-prone 
materials, such as cast iron, bare steel and unprotect-
ed coated steel, [5,6] making pipeline failure and cor-
rosion the two most common types of safety incidents 
reported by PHMSA. [2] Replacing aged infrastructure 
will reduce safety incidents caused by failure and cor-
rosion.
Damage also occurs from natural forces, such as 
floods, landslides and high winds, as well as damage 
from outside forces including vehicle impact, vandal-
ism and terrorism. [7,8] Hurricanes, earthquakes and 
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other weather-related events are dif-
ficult to protect against. [8] Outside 
forces primarily impact aboveground 
infrastructure in densely populated 
areas. [7] Placing pipeline infrastruc-
ture below ground reduces the risks 
of damage by outside forces and may 
assist in protecting against some nat-
ural forces.
Although burying all possible infra-
structure underground may lower the 
number of incidents caused by both 
natural and outside forces, under-
ground pipelines are still suscepti-
ble to damage caused by excavation 
events, including digging, trenching 
and grading. [9] To reduce the risk of 
excavation related incidents, pipeline 
location and depth must be more ac-
curately marked.
Incorrect Operation
Incorrect operation incidents resulting 
from human error are one of the least 
common incident types in the pipe-
line industry. [10,2] Increased auton-
omy of pipeline infrastructure, while 
encouraging further safety training 
among necessary personnel, may re-
duce these incidents. Other possible 
ways of reducing safety incidents, 
especially those involving human er-
ror, is the inclusion of safety culture 
assessments. By increasing safety 
awareness, employees are less likely 
to engage in behavior that may cause 
a safety incident, such as overfilling a 
tank, over pressurizing equipment, us-
ing improper equipment or techniques 
and not following established proce-
dures. [10]
Cyberattacks
Due to a rise in cyberattacks on critical 
infrastructure, [11] HDIAC’s analysis 
also included cyber threats. Although 
there was no PHMSA data on cyber 
related incidents, cyber threats are a 
growing concern to pipeline infrastruc-
ture. Many vulnerabilities arise with 
the connection of Supervisory Con-
trol and Data Acquisition systems to 
the Internet. [12,13] Weak, default or 
non-existent login credentials required 
to access the systems further com-
pound this problem. [13] To mitigate 
the risks of a cyber intrusion capable 
of hijacking control systems, HDIAC 
proposed stronger password require-
ments and limiting access to neces-
sary on-site personnel. 
Recommendations 
and Conclusion 
HDIAC’s analysis determined certain 
types of safety incidents, such as cor-
rosion and equipment failure, would 
become less prevalent by replacing 
aging pipeline infrastructure. Continu-
ous efforts to reduce safety incidents 
include employee training and/or sim-
ulations, burying available infrastruc-
ture underground and increasing the 
use of safety culture assessments. 
As other types of safety incidents be-
come less common, research shows 
that cyber threats against pipeline in-
frastructure would become more prev-
alent. [14]
The information provided by HDIAC 
allows the customer to view the trend 
of pipeline incident types over the last 
10 years and prepare mitigation efforts 
to reduce their occurrence and overall 
impact on the pipeline industry. Ad-
ditionally, knowing that cyberattacks 
against pipeline systems are likely to 
increase, while equipment failure and 
corrosion incidents are likely to de-
crease, assists in predicting and pre-
paring for future incidents.
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Urbanization and 
Megacities 
Over the past half century, the worldwide urban pop-ulation grew from 746 mil-lion in 1950 to 3.9 billion in 
2014, and experts project the popu-
lation will reach 5 billion in 2030 and 
6.3 billion by 2050. [1] This growth is 
primarily due to a pronounced urban-
ization trend. While only one-third of 
the global population was urban in 
1950 (29.5 percent), half (53.6 per-
cent) of the global population is urban 
today and two-thirds (66.4 percent) is 
projected to be urban by 2030. This 
urbanization trend is uneven: it does 
not lead to more urban areas but rath-
er to bigger metropolitan areas, with 
megacities [2] expected to grow at a 
faster pace than the rest of urban set-
tlements. 
Since the 1970s, the number of meg-
acities more than tripled (from eight to 
34), and is expected to further double 
until 2050 (to exceed 60). Almost all of 
these new megacities are emerging in 
geopolitical hotspots of the developing 
world, primarily in Southeast Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa. [1,3] The U.S. De-
partment of Defense, therefore, must 
consider the challenges presented by 
engagement in such environments 
when planning for its future. 
In a recent article, Maj. Christopher 
Bowers drew analogies between the 
experiences of the U.S. Army opera-
tions in 2004 and 2008 in Sadr City (a 
Shiite-controlled impoverished suburb 
district of Baghdad) and the project-
ed challenges of future operations in 
megacities. [4] He focused primarily on 
the challenges of scale, human terrain 
variations and governance. Indeed, 
the physical challenges of operating in 
such dense, highly three-dimensional, 
socially uneven and, often, ungovern-
able environments are immense.  
However, and this is the key focus of 
this contribution, the advanced func-
tional complexity of these large urban 
environments further compounds these 
challenges: megacities function at the 
intersection of the physical, social and 
cyber spaces. Accordingly, military 
operations in these locations must be 
prepared to engage in environments 
where news, ideas and opinions are 
often shaped in cyberspace and prop-
agated across the physical urban land-
scape. These processes lead to the 
formation and reformation of social 
networks to connect (or divide) popu-
lations, and facilitate the mobilization of 
these communities in response to on-
going events.  
Across continents and events, from 
protests in the Arab world and disasters 
in the Far East, to reactions to terror-
ist activities in the West, social media 
has been the communication avenue 
of choice for the general public. [5,6] 
Advancing the capability to analyze 
crowd-generated content in the form 
of social media feeds is a substantial 
scientific challenge with considerable 
implications for future DoD operations. 
Social Media and 
Intelligence
The term social media typically refers to 
services like Facebook, Twitter, Flickr 
and YouTube, which enable the gen-
eral public to communicate with peers, 
sharing information instantly and con-
stantly in an effortless and intuitive way. 
By bypassing the need for advanced 
computing skills to participate, and by 
fostering social interaction in cyber 
space, social media revolutionized in-
formation dissemination and presented 
Figure 1. An emerging framework to study urban systems. (Released)
Figure 2. Sociocultural hotspots in Singa-
pore detected through the classification 
of tweets originating from these loca-
tions: entertainment (shades of red), poli-
tics (shades of blue) and military (shades 
of green). (Released)
an alternate means for community 
formation. 
Today, Facebook has nearly 1.5 bil-
lion monthly active users worldwide 
(exceeding the populations of either 
China or India), while Instagram and 
Twitter have in excess of 400 and 300 
million users respectively. [7] While 
these are global applications, there 
exist a number of regional services 
as well. For example, the Chinese 
instant messaging platform Tencent 
QQ exceeds 800 million active ac-
counts, while the Russian VKontakte 
service has 100 million local active 
users. These communities contribute 
massive amounts of crowd-gener-
ated data. Every minute, more than 
300,000 status updates are posted 
in Facebook and 450,000 new tweets 
are generated, while 65,000 new 
photos are uploaded in Instagram, [8] 
leading to the emergence of a new 
big data paradigm. [9]
Analyzing the content of these contri-
butions is all about finding connection 
patterns. Connections among users 
(e.g., formed as they respond to, or 
follow, other users) reveal the under-
lying social structure of the user com-
munity. Word co-occurrences lead to 
the formation of semantic connections 
among the terms used in social media 
(e.g., words that are used commonly 
together in the context of a particular 
discussion), and in doing so reveal 
the complex narrative of this public 
discourse. Connections among loca-
tions (e.g., coordinates from which 
the contributions originate, or of ref-
erences to specific locations) reveal 
the geographical footprint of various 
communities. It is through the analy-
sis of these multiple connections that 
one can decode the convoluted con-
tent of social media feeds. This can 
be of interest to a variety of applica-
tions, including intelligence.    
The significance of social media for 
intelligence was demonstrated quite 
vividly during the Arab Spring events 
across North Africa and the Middle 
East in early 2011. Platforms like 
Twitter, Facebook and YouTube were 
instrumental in reporting news from 
these events, [10] and in supporting 
the organization and coordination of 
related activities. [11] While this is 
widely considered a watershed mo-
ment for the use of social media in 
geopolitical events, it was not the first 
time this happened. Twenty months 
before the Arab Spring, in June 2009, 
social media platforms were used to 
broadcast to the world real-time infor-
mation from the clashes in the streets 
of Teheran following the rigged Ira-
nian presidential election, bypassing 
the state-imposed crackdown on cri-
sis coverage. [11] 
In the time since these first glimpses 
at their communication power, social 
media has been used in response to 
natural disasters and the Fukushima 
nuclear accident in the Far East; used 
to communicate information following 
terrorist attacks in the streets of Bos-
ton and Paris; and abused by the Is-
lamic State of Iraq and the Levant in 
the Middle East. [12,13,14]
Decoding Urban 
Complexity through Social 
Media Analysis 
With megacities emerging as the-
aters of events and operations, a new 
framework is needed for monitoring, 
analysis and modeling. Toward this 
goal, megacities are treated with 
an alternative view, as information 
hubs. Five years ago, in 2010, then 
Google CEO Eric Schmidt, pointed 
out the world was generating nearly 
five exabytes of data every two days, 
the equivalent of the sum of informa-
tion generated by humanity from the 
dawn of civilization up until the begin-
ning of this millennium. [15] Most of 
that information is generated in cities 
through smart devices (from traffic 
cameras to smart appliances) or from 
their residents (through their social 
media activities). Accordingly, opera-
tions in megacities are operations in 
information-rich environments.
 
A novel framework for studying meg-
acities, therefore, must be charac-
terized by the collaborative use of 
authoritative (e.g., mapping and cen-
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Figure 3. A (left): The discussion about Syria in Twitter. The size of the nodes indicates the level of participation by different 
international communities, proportional to the number of tweets originating from these countries normalized by the local 
populations. B (right): Social networks embedded within a geographical content, leading to connected, non-contiguous 
areas of operations. (Released)
sus data) and crowd-generated (e.g., 
content harvested from social media) 
content (see Figure 1). It is through 
the collaborative analysis of these data 
sources that one can fully capture the 
complex structure and functionality of 
these large urban areas. Some lessons 
learned from on-going studies in this 
emerging framework help us realize 
some notable particularities associated 
with operating in such information-rich 
environments and are listed below. 
Cities Are More Complex 
Spaces Than Their 
Geometries
While the three-dimensional layout of 
a city remains important, cities cannot 
be viewed as pure geometrical spaces. 
Buildings and road networks enable 
and support certain actions and opera-
tions, and as such, it is critical to main-
tain the most up-to-date information for 
them; but cities are more than their ge-
ometries. Human activities and percep-
tions augment geometry 
by assigning to locations 
different sociocultural 
meaning, transforming 
these locations into plac-
es. While some of these 
places are well estab-
lished and widely known 
(e.g., the theater district 
in Manhattan, or the 
artsy Bastille district in 
Paris), other places are 
more dynamic, occurring 
for example, temporarily, 
in response to particular 
events. 
For example, Cairo’s 
Tahrir Square gained a 
totally different mean-
ing on Jan. 25, 2011, 
when it was occupied by 
50,000 protesters, mark-
ing the beginning of the 
revolution against Hosni 
Mubarak’s regime. [16] 
Capturing such informa-
tion is becoming feasi-
ble through analyzing 
crowd-generated con-
tent. 
Figure 2 shows different 
sociocultural hotspots 
in Singapore, detect-
ed by analyzing tweets 
originating from the city 
over a period of a month. 
Tweets were classi-
fied by analyzing their 
content into one of various thematic 
categories, and spatial clusters were 
identified to mark the corresponding 
hotspots—in this particular case, enter-
tainment, politics and military. 
In a similar manner, one could iden-
tify hotspots associated with other 
sociocultural issues that elicit public 
mentions in social media (e.g., health, 
finance) and at various levels of gran-
ularity (e.g., identifying references to a 
particular health issue as opposed to 
health at large). Through this process 
one could identify urban sociocultur-
al hotspots. The aggregate of these 
hotspots is the equivalent of seman-
tic map of the city, identifying mean-
ingful sociocultural subdivisions and 
their variations over time. Through this 
process one can identify, for example, 
friendly or hostile areas and their evo-
lution in response to certain events; 
hotspots for or against a certain issue; 
and even monitor the progress in space 
and through time of a civil unrest event. 
[17] Harvesting such local knowledge 
directly from crowd-generated content 
offers the additional advantage of elim-
inating the potential biases often asso-
ciated with cross-cultural analysis.
 Containment is Challenging 
in a Networked World
By substituting physical with virtual in-
teraction, social media have introduced 
a novel avenue for community building, 
transcending established boundaries 
to diffuse ideas and information across 
space. This leads to the formation of 
highly-connected communities that are 
spatially distributed. As a result, an area 
of operations is no longer geometrically 
bound: the individuals operating with-
in it may be connected (virtually, even 
though not physically) to other groups 
or individuals at distant locations, be-
yond the particular area of operations 
boundaries. Accordingly, events that 
occur at these distant locations may af-
fect the area of operations, often in an 
unpredictable manner. 
As an example, Figure 3 A shows the 
formation of an international communi-
ty because of the discourse in Twitter 
regarding Syria. [18] Remote commu-
nities participate in this debate, influ-
encing and being influenced by the lo-
cal Syrian community. The effect of this 
process is to connect these remote 
locations, creating a virtual community 
that transcends space, comprising lo-
cals and foreigners alike. 
From an operational standpoint this is 
visualized in Figure 3 B: three distinct 
neighborhoods, (the three disjointed 
gray blobs) are connected through the 
connections of individuals or groups 
within them (the colored nodes, with 
each color denoting a particular on-line 
community). While nodes within each 
neighborhood are connected (via spa-
tial proximity) to other nodes within it, 
certain nodes are also connected (via 
social proximity) to distant nodes in 
the other neighborhoods. Accordingly, 
operations within each neighborhood 
would be affected by the events occur-
ring in the rest, establishing a non-con-
tiguous area of operations. Advancing 
the ability to identify these connections 
and gaining a better understanding of 
the footprint of an area of operations 
could lead to substantial operational 
benefits.       
Figure 4. Top: A retweet network formed through interac-
tions during the first 10 minutes after the Boston Mara-
thon bombing of April 15, 2013. Bottom: The geographi-
cal distribution of these retweets. (Released)
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Information Authority is a 
New Challenge
In the new paradigm of information 
dissemination through social me-
dia information, authority is a chal-
lenge. Figure 4 shows the network of 
retweets (top) and its spatial distribu-
tion (bottom) of Twitter traffic during 
the first 10 minutes after the Boston 
Marathon bombing. The network of 
retweets captures the communities 
formed through retweet activities: 
once a user retweets a post, the user 
is connected to the original author. 
Through this process, communities 
emerge as node clusters, indicating 
groups of users that are sharing sto-
ries. Bigger communities (i.e. ones 
with larger membership) are more in-
fluential than smaller ones. 
Figure 4 overlays upon each com-
munity cluster the name of its central 
node, i.e. a highly influential member 
for that community. It is interesting to 
observe that during this critical period 
the top news disseminating node was 
not an official government account: 
Boston Police is rather peripheral in 
the discussion, representing a rela-
tively small community at the upper 
right-hand side of the graph. 
Instead, the top news disseminating 
node then was the Twitter account 
of Anonymous (@YourAnonNews), 
surpassing even official news orga-
nizations (@cnnbrk, @nypost, @
BostonGlobe) and the ever popular 
celebrities (@AlfredoFlores, @Lil-
Tunechi). This exemplifies the chal-
lenge of authority in this participatory 
information ecosystem: a large part 
of the population was getting its infor-
mation from unvetted sources, and as 
such may be vulnerable to manipula-
tive dissemination of misinformation. 
Given the spatial footprint of these 
communities (Figure 4, bottom) one 
can easily realize this information may 
very well be provided by overseas ac-
counts. To further emphasize this vul-
nerability, in the fall of 2014, Russian 
government-affiliated hackers tested 
their abilities to disseminate false in-
formation and spread panic. In Sep-
tember, 2014 the hackers used fake 
social media accounts to make up a 
fake story about a fictional disaster 
in a real chemical plant in Louisiana, 
and followed in December, 2014 with 
posts reporting a fake outbreak of Eb-
ola in Atlanta. [19] 
These challenges represent a new 
type of cybersecurity concern, where 
the issue is not denial of service (as is 
usually the case with traditional cyber-
security attacks) but rather the denial 
of information, or the spread of misin-
formation. Accordingly, operations in 
information-rich urban areas may be 
subject to such challenges, leading to 
highly volatile environments.
Conclusion 
Megacities are challenging operation-
al environments, as they function at 
the intersection of the physical, social 
and cyber spaces. By viewing them 
as information hubs, the DoD can 
gain a better understanding of the 
way in which they are organized and 
operate. Therefore, a novel approach 
for studying megacities is emerging, 
characterized by the collaborative 
use of authoritative and crowd-gener-
ated content. 
Harvesting information from social 
media allows the military to capture 
the complex sociocultural multidi-
mensionality and the multiple links 
that characterize these modern urban 
environments. It also offers the added 
advantage of gaining such knowledge 
directly from the local population. In 
this approach, data is an operational 
commodity. However, the immersion 
in such a data-rich framework comes 
at the cost of a challenged authority, 
with official government agencies en-
joying only a limited presence com-
pared to other leaders of the social 
media ecosystem. Refining analytical 
capabilities will help overcome this 
challenge and take full advantage of 
the presented opportunities.
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By: Matthew Dowling, Ph.D.
Limiting Blood Loss on the
BATTLEFIELD
Combat survivability is at an all-time high, however caring for the wounded on the battle-field is an ongoing challenge 
for military forces. The ability to quickly 
stabilize the injured on-site increases 
the likelihood of successful treatment 
and transport to a medical facility. Be-
tween 2001 and 2011, hemorrhage, 
or uncontrolled blood loss, represent-
ed more than 80 percent of poten-
tially survivable battlefield deaths. [1] 
With improved medical technologies 
and techniques, hemorrhage control 
and survivability could significantly in-
crease. 
Non-compressible injuries are difficult 
for field medics to control, and there-
fore, the majority of deaths occur be-
fore transporting the patient to a hos-
pital. [2,3] The current protocol for field 
treatment of hemorrhage, according to 
Tactical Combat Casualty Care guide-
lines, is to apply tourniquets and other 
topical agents, such as Combat Gauze, 
to the affected area. [4] Topical hemo-
static sealants may be used as adjuncts 
in cases where conventional measures 
for bleeding control fail, but the major-
ity of these products are bandages or 
powders that require compression and 
wound visibility. [5] These attributes 
make the protocol products ineffective 
in treating non-compressible wounds, 
such as those in the groin or neck. [6]
The capability gap is evident. The De-
fense Health Agency is currently as-
sessing technologies to address the 
unmet medical need of hemorrhage 
control. [7] The lack of a readily avail-
able capability for non-compressible 
hemorrhage is a high research priority 
for the Department of Defense. [8]
When wounded, the body naturally be-
gins the healing process by clotting the 
blood. A network of proteins comes to-
gether to form an insoluble barrier, pre-
venting further blood loss. [9]
Many experiments on 
alternate clotting tech-
nologies, such as fibrino-
gen-coated albumin micro-
particles, thrombin-based 
hemostatic agents, lyo-
philized platelets and con-
jugated red blood cells, 
show insignificant out-
comes on both compress-
ible and non-compressible 
hemorrhage wounds. [10,11] These 
experimental hemostatic agents were 
not only ineffective, but expensive, re-
quired refrigeration and, in some cas-
es, caused septicemia. [12]
Currently available products, such as 
proteins and aluminosilicates, contain 
significant challenges for use in military 
environments. Protein formulations are 
expensive and degrade in hot climates, 
making them impractical for use in cur-
rent theaters of operation, such as Iraq 
and Afghanistan. [13] Aluminosilicates 
are inexpensive, but may be toxic and 
cause permanent tissue damage when 
administered. [14]
Scientists created an artificial clotting 
process that mimics natural clotting 
principles. The research resulted in the 
development of a hemostatic bandage 
that will stop the flow of blood. This 
development, if implemented in both 
military and civilian trauma centers, will 
increase survivability. [15]
Figure 1. Concept of a hemostatic foam to treat non-compressible hemorrhage. 
Hemorrhage occurring from a wound in the truncal area, as shown in (a), cannot 
be treated by applying compression of a bandage. In this case, it is envisioned that 
a hemostatic foam can be sprayed into the wound cavity (b). The foam expands 
into the cavity and forms a solid barrier that counteracts the expulsion of blood (c). 
Active ingredients in the foam can also interact with the blood, promoting blood 
clotting or gelation. The net result is that hemostasis is rapidly achieved and the 
bleeding is thereby contained (d). (Released)
Figure 2. Hemostatic foams based on hmC. The foam is created by load-
ing an aqueous solution of hmC and propellant into an aluminum canis-
ter. The structure of hmC (with C12 hydrophobes) is shown in the inset. 
The molecules are schematically represented by a blue (hydrophilic) 
backbone and purple hydrophobes attached to the backbone. When 
the actuator on the canister is pressed, a gas-in-liquid foam emerges. 
The gas bubbles in the foam are stabilized by adsorbed hmC chains, 
as shown in the inset. Note that the hydrophobes from these chains 
are oriented towards the gas phase while the hydrophilic backbone is 
oriented towards the aqueous liquid phase. (Released)
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Additionally, scientists developed a 
hemostatic foam, which uses a com-
pound of widely available and cost 
effective naturally occurring biopoly-
mers. [16] The foam uses chitosan, 
the second most abundant biopoly-
mer on earth, which functions sim-
ilarly to the natural healing process. 
[17] Chitosan is a polysaccharide, ob-
tained by modifying chitin, a naturally 
occurring compound found in crusta-
ceans. [18] Scientists add hydropho-
bic tails, creating a hydrophobically 
modified chitosan, which allows the 
biopolymer to self-assemble into gel-
like physical seals upon contact with 
blood. [15]
The blood cells integrate into a matrix 
connected by the hm-chitosan, cre-
ating a gel network to stop the blood 
flow. The gelation activates only at the 
contacting interface of the wound site; 
therefore, the hm-chitosan will not 
cause clotting in undesirable areas of 
the body. [15] The blood cells aggluti-
nate rapidly into a large 3-dimension-
al network, creating a gel that forms 
a strong bond and inhibits bleeding. 
[19]
Once at the hospital, medical person-
nel remove the hemostatic patch by 
adding α-cyclodextrin, which reverses 
the hemostatic gel and neutralizes 
the foam, rendering the hydrophobic 
properties of the hm-chitosan 
ineffective. [19]
Hm-chitosan is used commercially 
as a compressible hemostatic agent, 
but aerosolized hemostatic foam has 
not been utilized. [20] The hm-chi-
tosan-modified aerosol produces a 
foam dispensed from a standard, 
lightweight, pressurized aluminum 
canister, making it a practical tool 
for field medics. The compact canis-
ter does not require refrigeration and 
does not expire. [20] Soldiers would 
be able to carry the products and treat 
wounds onsite, speeding response 
time and improving survivability. In 
addition, the foam could potentially 
Figure 3. Immobilization of blood by hmC foam. At time t = 0, the foam of hmC ((5 mol% of C12 hydrophobes) is introduced 
into a tube containing 5 mL of heparinized bovine blood (a). The foam rapidly expands and overflows out of the tube (b). 
The self-supporting nature of the foam allows it to act as a physical barrier to blood flow due to gravity (c). In addition, the 
interaction of blood cells with the active ingredient (hmC) leads to the clustering of blood cells (see text and Figure 6) and 
thereby to the containment and immobilization of blood (d).  (Released)
Figure 4.  Photomicrograph of blood mixed with HM-CS foam. In 4a, a photograph of HM-CS foam filling the peritoneal cavi-
ty after application to the injured site is shown. Fig 4b shows a post-mortem image of the excised pieces of liver juxtaposed 
to the remaining medial lobe of the liver. In the histogram in 4c, total blood loss from each sample group is displayed. 
(Released)
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be self-administered. [21]
Because of its self-expanding proper-
ties, the hemostatic foam fills the cav-
ities of non-compressible wounds rap-
idly, reducing blood loss and improving 
survival. The foam uses the same prin-
ciples of hm-chitosan by converting the 
liquid blood into a self-supporting gel.
In pre-trial tests, the foam lessened 
blood loss from a non-compressible 
bleed in a pig liver. In the experiment, 
scientists allowed the liver to bleed for 
one minute. After one minute, they ap-
plied the foam to the injury site, mon-
itored the site for hemostasis and re-
corded the total blood loss. Different 
concentrations (5 percent, 2.5 percent 
and 1 percent of available amines 
along the chitosan backbone) of hy-
drophobic modifications to the chitosan 
foam were tested. [22]
Hemostasis was achieved immediately 
and sustained over the duration of the 
experiment with hm-chitosan foams. 
The experiments’ results showed the 
5 percent hydrophobically-modified 
chitosan foam was the most effective, 
decreasing blood loss by 90 percent. 
[23] The hydrophobes increase stabili-
ty and promote interaction between the 
hm-chitosan foam and the blood cells 
at the injury site, while showing no sig-
nificant toxicity to the cells. [20] 
The ability to control blood loss on the 
battlefield will be a significant factor 
in increasing survivability of wounded 
soldiers. The use of an aerosolized 
hemostatic foam agent will, additional-
ly, meet the DoD’s requirements for a 
cost-effective, easy to use and resilient 
technology. 
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Figure 5. In 5a (left), survival rate 
from rat liver injury is shown. 
No treatment (NT) and chitosan 
(CS) controls resulted in 0% 
survival, with deaths occurring 
~20 min after injury. All HM-CS 
had recorded occurrences of 
survival at 60 minutes: HM-CS1 
(1/5), HM-CS2 (1/5), HM-CS3 
(2/5), HM-CS4 (5/5), and HM-
CS5 (5/5). The samples with the 
highest level of hydrophobicitiy, 
HM-CS4 and HM-CS5, achieved 
the highest rates of survival.  In 
5b (right), a Kaplan-Meier Analy-
sis of HM-CS foams on the inju-
ry is shown. (Released)
Figure 6. Testing the hemostatic efficacy of hmC foams against a pig liver injury. Initially, a laceration is made in the liver of the 
pig using a scalpel (a). After 1 min of free bleeding, the hmC foam is sprayed onto the injury site from the canister (b). No com-
pression is used. The injury is monitored thereafter and the total blood loss is measured. We find that hemostasis is achieved 
rapidly and sustained for the course of the experiment, as shown by (c). The results indicate that hmC foams can successfully 
treat hemorrhage without the need for compression. (Released)
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The Homeland Defense and Security Information Analy-sis Center recently conduct-ed research and analysis 
on possible Department of Defense 
applications for chondroitin sulfate 
glycosaminoglycan hydrogels.
Background
CS-GAG hydrogels are a modifica-
tion of hyaluronic acid. HA, found 
naturally in the human body, is pro-
duced in the plasma membrane of 
vertebrate cells. [1] HA hydrogels 
have been used successfully in cell 
delivery and many other biomedical 
applications. [2] Modification of nat-
ural HA to create CS-GAG hydro-
gels includes chemically adding ad-
ditional sulfate groups to enhance 
their durability within the body. [3] 
Commonly used in cell delivery or 
transplant applications, hydrogels 
are successful because they have 
properties similar to surrounding tis-
sue, which prevents rejection by the 
body. [3] The CS-GAG hydrogels 
create a matrix that encapsulates 
target cells to transplant into the 
body. [3] 
Traumatic Brain Injury
Understanding the interdependen-
cies among different neurological 
disorders bridges the gap between 
research and treatment. Traumatic 
brain injury is a neurological disor-
der closely correlated with post-trau-
matic stress disorder. [4] According 
to a study funded by the U.S. Office 
of Veterans Affairs, at least 20 per-
cent of Iraq and Afghanistan veter-
ans suffer from PTSD. The number 
more than doubles, however, when 
TBI is considered. [5] Addressing 
and treating neurological damage 
can help promote the treatment of 
psychological disorders. [6] HDIAC 
identified the benefits of using CS-
GAG hydrogels to repair neurologi-
cal damage after TBI so that it may 
help alleviate PTSD.
CS-GAG hydrogels have neural 
stem cells integrated in the ma-
trix for treating TBI. [3] There is an 
increase in the incidence of TBI 
among active duty U.S. military per-
sonnel due to heavy use of impro-
vised explosive devices.
HDIAC identified a capability gap 
and recommended solutions and 
further uses for CS-GAG hydro-
gels. Statistics show 92 percent of 
TBI incidents are mild to moderate. 
Severe TBI, the target demographic 
for treatment with CS-GAG hydro-
gel, is approximately 8 percent of 
total cases. [7] 
Research indicates treatment gaps 
in mild TBI cases, which are the 
most common. By focusing on the 
use of CS-GAG hydrogel in the most 
severe occurrences, researchers 
eliminate 92 percent of potential pa-
tients. [8] The CS-GAG hydrogels 
have innovative properties that pre-
vent their degradation by enzyme, 
allowing them to remain in the body 
and extend the time stem cells have 
to generate and grow. [3] In addi-
tion, CS-GAG hydrogels have an-
ti-inflammatory factors, so they are 
safe to use in the brain and do not 
cause additional swelling. [3]
Vision
HDIAC’s analyses included DoD 
applications that will benefit service-
men as well as civilians. There is a 
neurological connection between 
the eye and the brain, thus TBI 
may affect vision. [9] Among ser-
vice members who served in Oper-
ations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom, eye trauma is the second 
most common injury and 75 percent 
of TBI patients experience vision 
problems. [10] Hyaluronic acid is a 
natural wound healer, and is found 
as a component of eye tissue. [11] 
Traditionally, drug carriers have not 
been successful in the eye because 
they are unable to maintain local-
ized sustained release of drugs. 
[12] CS-GAG hydrogel degrades 
at a slower rate than HA hydrogels, 
and thus, is a better solution for 
drug delivery to the eye. 
Hearing
HDIAC highlighted some additional 
areas of research where CS-GAG 
hydrogels would greatly benefit and 
extend current research. Hearing 
impairment is the most common 
form of service-connected disability 
among military veterans and one of 
the more common sensory losses 
resulting from blast trauma. [13,14] 
The inner ear hair cells transform 
sounds into electrical signals, which 
are sent to the brain for interpreta-
tion. Damage to these cells by loud 
noises, as would be common on 
the battlefield, can cause hearing 
impairment or even deafness. [14] 
HDAIC made the connection be-
tween the similarities of the inner 
ear hair cells and neural stem cells. 
Inner ear hair cells are non-regen-
erative, but neural stem cells have 
similar characteristics and are able 
to reestablish some auditory con-
tacts, making them a potential re-
placement. [14] 
Developing effective inner ear hair 
cells from neural stem cells is diffi-
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cult due to the nervous integration of 
these cells. [14] The hydrogel’s ability 
to enhance trophic factors, molecules 
that allow a neuron to develop and 
maintain connections, [15] could be 
beneficial in overcoming this obstacle.
Knee Injury
HDIAC recognized that rigorous phys-
ical training associated with the U.S. 
Army, and in-the-field complications, 
makes knee injuries among the most 
common musculoskeletal injuries in the 
Army, and connected these statistics to 
the research done with CS-GAG hydro-
gels. [16] Normal wear and tear of knee 
cartilage causes pain and loss of func-
tionality and tissue engineering can 
be employed as a potential treatment. 
Tissue engineering mainly focuses on 
developing tissue and organ substi-
tutes. [17] Clinical methods are limited 
in their cartilage tissue regeneration, 
thus tissue regeneration with Sulfat-
ed CS-GAG can be a viable solution. 
Hydrogels alone lack the robustness 
required for many applications [18] but 
Sulfated CS-GAG in conjunction with 
growth factors can be used as a ma-
trix to promote cartilage regeneration, a 
challenge not yet achieved. [19]
Conclusion
The need for biomimetic research, like 
that of CS-GAG hydrogels, will contin-
ue to prove themselves multifunctional. 
Longitudinal studies and trend analy-
sis will determine future growth in this 
field. The research completed by HDI-
AC highlighted the value of CS-GAG 
hydrogels on future DoD applications. 
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HDIAC Call for Papers
The HDIAC Journal is a quarterly publication, focusing on novel developments and tech-
nology in the alternative energy, biometrics, CBRN, critical infrastructure protection, cul-
tural studies, homeland defense and security, medical and weapons of mass destruction 
fields. 
• Articles must be relevant to one of the eight focus areas and relate to Department of 
Defense applications. 
• Articles should be submitted electronically as a Microsoft Word document. 
• We require a maximum of 3,000 words.
• All submissions must include graphics or images (300 DPI or higher in JPG or PNG 
format) to accompany the article. Photo or image credit should be included in the 
caption.
HDIAC is now accepting 
abstracts and articles 
for consideration for 
the 2016 publications. 
For more information, 
contact the Managing 
Editor at publications@
hdiac.org
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